Opposing this force were the 5 000 troops under Penn-Symons at Dundee, and the 9 600 troops at Ladysmith under Lieutenant-General George White. For their part, the British hoped to defeat the Republican forces in a single battle that would ensure peace before Christmas 1899. To achieve this the British congregated their forces around Dundee, leaving the Newcastle and Upper Tugela Districts, part of the Dundee District, 3 and the area immediately south of the Tugela River open to an invasion by the Boers.
Either through ignorance or arrogance, or despite leaving almost the entire length of the border with the Republics undefended, the Natal authorities believed that not much would come from a Boer invasion. Proof of this confidence is the fact that very little was done to assist the civilians, mostly Afrikaners, who remained in Northern Natal. In a response to an enquiry regarding his safety, WAC Bester of the farm Fourieskraal on the outskirts of Ladysmith, was informed by the local magistrate, that he could remain on his farm as he would be safe. 4 Others received similar assurances and proceeded to continue with their normal economic activities. 5 Most of the English residents of Klip River County, however, either received different advice, or acted on the principle of safety first, because they fled south to Durban and Pietermaritzburg. As a result only a handful of English and almost all the Afrikaners of Klip River County, the dominant European group resident in the area, remained to face the Boers.
The result of this encounter was one of the enduring questions facing any invading military force: what to do with civilians related to them by language, culture, ethnic origin and kin. At the same time the country being invaded needed to consider what measures or policies to adopt towards their subjects related to the invaders. Military History is littered with similar examples: be it Germans resident in Eastern Europe prior to the Second World War or Japanese resident in America and Canada during the same war. 6 Within this context Natal Afrikaners found themselves in a political vice grip for the 242-days the Boer occupation of Klip River County lasted.
In terms of the historiography of the Anglo-Boer War, apart from some cameos in general works, very little has been written on the experiences of Natal Afrikaners during this conflict. Although limited in scale and scope, groundbreaking work was done by Verne Harris on the experiences of especially the Dundee Afrikaners.
7 Mark Coghlan, in his doctoral thesis, refers extensively to the strained relationship between Natal Afrikaners and the Natal Volunteers. Coghlan, however, generally writes from the perspective of the Natal Volunteers and as such does not treat Natal Afrikaners as victims but rather as collaborators, or at the very least, sympathisers with the Boer cause. 8 Within this context it is envisaged that this article will contribute to the expansion of the existing knowledge on the war experiences of especially the Klip River County Afrikaners.
Between the Republics and the Empire
The Natal authorities were, based on the reports they had received, convinced that the vast majority of their Afrikaner subjects would behave perfectly loyal. Governor Hely-Hutchinson could therefore inform Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain that: "The most one can expect is that they take no active part against us. Here and there, no doubt there are actively disloyal men. But as long as the British troops suffer no reverses here is no probability that, as a body, the Natal Dutch would take an active part against us." 9 For their part, the Boers accepted that the Natal Afrikaners would respond to 6 Afrikaners around Dundee were also intimidated and harassed, especially by the Natal Carbineers, a colonial volunteer unit, as the following report testifies: "That morning we caught what we hoped would turn out a Boer spy, but he proved to be a law-abiding farmer. We had to keep him till our Boer linguists came to interrogate him. We put the fear of death into him to understand very clearly that all spies were to be hung up to a tree and a small fire made under them, and we showed him where it was done -our fireplace under a thorntree. In the light of the British reversal and to protect loyal and faithful subjects, Governor Hely-Hutchinson issued Proclamation No. 108, extending Martial Law to all of Natal as well as Proviso B and Zululand. In the proclamation he made it clear that certain British subjects in the Klip River County and Upper Tugela District were suspected of supporting and providing information to the Boers, while others had rebelled and attempted to incite more people to do the same. 38 With the Boers in complete control of all of Klip River County, Attorney-General Henry Bale deemed the issuing of Proclamation No. 108 "a little late".
39
Considering that the Natal and British authorities had deserted them, and the Boers had successfully invaded Natal, the Klip River County Afrikaners, in one of the recurring themes in the tragedy of war, were compelled to make some harrowing decisions: co-operate, resist passively or offer active resistance. In making their decision they had to weigh loyalty to the crown and the long term impact of their decision against the imperatives of blood ties and incipient Afrikaner nationalism, sympathy for the cause of the Boer Republics and hope for a Boer victory against the fear of the immediate consequences of the rebellion. 40 The decision of the vast majority was not what the invaders had anticipated, for despite the military successes of the Boers and the desertion and maltreatment by the Colonial and Imperial forces and authorities the Afrikaners of Klip River County did not join the commandos in significant numbers. They preferred to remain passive and neutral in matters military in all probability because they knew, thanks to the various proclamations and warnings and pre-war talk, the negative consequences associated with any treasonable deeds.
The Republican's take action
When the Boers eventually issued a proclamation, No. 20 of 1899 of the ZAR, on 9 November 1899, it was different from the one the Natal authorities had anticipated. General PJ (Piet) Joubert, proclaimed Martial Law in all the Districts occupied by the Boer forces, thereby authorising officers to seize all supplies required to maintain the commandos. The proclamation also notified the inhabitants of the penalties which would be inflicted for assistance given to the British forces, simultaneously undertaking to protect the life and property of all those who placed themselves under the protection of the ZAR and obeyed its laws. All those who refused to submit would be granted permission to leave the Klip River County within seven days. Persons who were driven from their farms or homes, or who had fled, would be allowed to return. 41 The proclamation of Martial Law caused a great deal of confusion. ZAR officials like Under Secretary of State JC Krogh, General SW (Schalk) Burger and Justice of the Peace (hereafter JP) DP Wolfaardt from then on repeatedly declared that the institution of Martial Law meant that the Klip River County had been annexed to the Transvaal and that its inhabitants no longer owed allegiance to the crown. Within a week of it being issued the gist of Joubert's proclamation was known to many local Afrikaners, and at least two men from Newcastle by the surname of Terblanche indicated that they would join the Boers when the proclamation became "official" with the annexation of the Klip River County to the Transvaal. 42 Before long most Klip River County Afrikaners also took the declaration of Martial Law to mean the same as annexation. In time the renowned Natal historians Russell 43 and Brooks and Webb 44 likewise took the proclamation of Martial Law to mean annexation.
The proclamation was, however, never supposed to mean annexation or give the Natal Afrikaners the right to rescind their loyalty to the crown. Instead, Joubert had a clear picture in his mind of the position Natal Afrikaners found themselves in. He, after all, resided in the Volksrust District, only a short way across the border from Natal and knew the mind set of the Natal Afrikaners. 45 Although they generally received the Boers in a very friendly and helpful manner, they did so without compromising their loyalty to the Empire. An insightful Joubert expressed the fear harboured by many Natal Afrikaners at this stage namely, that the ZAR Government would not be able to defend them against persecution from the Natal authorities if they joined the Boers, or if the latter suffered serious reversals. Many local Afrikaners thought they knew the answer and thus by early November 1899, they had not risen spontaneously to join the invaders in large numbers.
46
Officials of the Republican Governments, other Boers and some leading Natal Afrikaners, felt differently and viewed the lack of enthusiasm for the war effort, on the part of the Klip River County Afrikaners, as a great disappointment since they could have strengthened the Boer forces and assisted them in combating the lawlessness reigning in the County. Consequently it was determined to "commandeer the Afrikaners in Klip River County so as not only to bring pressure to bear upon the unwilling, but to afford, if possible, a pretext under which waverers who took up arms might shelter 42 Using his initiative, and the power vested in him by the absence of Joubert, Schalk Burger took control of the situation by producing a "General Notice", and in so doing placed his personal stamp on the proclamation issued by Joubert by dividing the County into three divisions -Newcastle, Dundee and Ladysmith -under the Christiaan Botha, JHF Meyer and TR Dannhauser respectively, while Lodewyk de Jager was appointed as Native Commissioner. This crude military administration had the duty to: "A. Record the names of all the inhabitants of their respective divisions, noting the loyalty or political attitude which each one wishes to adopt; B. Hold meetings in their respective divisions or wards on Wednesday 29th inst., for the election of Field-Cornets for the divisions or wards; C. Together with the elected Field-Cornets, each for his ward, to deliver to me the prepared lists and report on the execution of their instructions." In the week and a bit after Generals Joubert and Botha headed south, the world of the Klip River Afrikaners changed forever. In the first instance the clause in Joubert's proclamation that allowed seven days grace for those wishing to leave the County, was never implemented. Secondly, Burger and his inner circle of Natal Afrikaners started with the implementation of the document. For this the press was used. In the 17 November 1899 edition of De Volksstem it was announced that the Klip River County Afrikaners, under the leadership of Otto Krogman and Lodewyk de Jager, were set to join the commandos. 51 On the same day a rumour started to circulate that all Afrikaners in the area would have to report to Elandslaagte within days. Missionary Prozesky captured the Afrikaner reactions to this: "My neighbours will have to go too; it will cost many tears." 52 Pressure was simultaneously exerted on other Europeans like the German community at Elandskraal, to swear allegiance to the Transvaal since the proclamation had supposedly also ended their allegiance to the crown.
53
The perpetrated deception that Joubert's proclamation had turned the inhabitants of the Klip River County into Transvaal subjects was supported by a second ruse. Talk of a possible black uprising first started to surface in late October1899.
54
These rumours gained substance and local Afrikaners were informed that a black uprising was imminent and that they had no choice but to join the forces of the Transvaal to combat it. By the time Burger had penned his General Notice, rumours about armed Zulus between Wasbank and Dundee had become so convincing that a telegraphist and some railway workers had fled from Wasbank to Elandslaagte. 55 In time the Natal Afrikaners would realise that this rumour merely served as a pretext to conscript them.
Thus, when General Piet Joubert had retreated to north of the Tugela by the end of November 1899, the circumstances in the Klip River County had changed dramatically. Therefore, when he, suspecting that the Boer cause was spent, urged President Paul Kruger to seek means to bring about peace, 56 he was informed that it was not possible for, amongst other reasons, because it would amount to the betrayal of the Natal and Cape Afrikaners who had joined the Republican cause.
57

Conscripting the Dundee District Afrikaners
The enforcement of the General Notice took place via several meetings, the first of such which took place at Wasbank. All the white male inhabitants of the Dundee District and surrounding areas received a letter from Lodewyk de Jager, the newly appointed native commissioner, instructing them to attend a meeting at Wasbank Station on 20 November 1899.
58 They needed to be armed with food for three days, a rifle and 200 rounds of ammunition. Feeling that it was their duty to obey the order, a large number of Afrikaners from Dundee and Ladysmith attended the gathering. Only some arrived armed. De Jager had organised the meeting under the pretext that a black uprising was immanent and that a commando was needed to put it down. In the process he used his position of wealth and authority to influence many of those who attended to adopt a pro-conscription attitude. and several people left. 63 As a result the meeting was adjourned until the next day, 21
November. 64 The majority, however, remained behind that evening and slaughtered an ox, sold for this purpose to the Transvaal Government by Lodewyk de Jager.
65
The following day Assistant Commandant-General Schalk Burger arrived from Modderspruit to attend the meeting. 66 He proceeded to read Joubert's proclamation, the first time it was aired in public; a full four days after the terms it contained had expired. 67 Burger then informed those present that the Klip River County had become part of the ZAR and that it was therefore their duty to obey the commandeering order, and that the local Afrikaners would in doing so, incur no liability to the British Government. 68 NJ (Piet) van Rensenburg of Dundee spoke alongside Schalk Burger and, trying to convince people to join, said that a brother in need must be helped. 69 Again not everyone present accepted this injunction and another debate followed centring on what would happen should they join the Boers and subsequently be apprehended by the British. Burger responded with the question: "Will not they treat me the same as you."
70
The presence of and speech by Burger paid dividends and a substantial number of the Afrikaners present were convinced that they had become Transvaal subjects 71 and were compelled to throw in their lot with the Boers and be commandeered. 72 Others, in all likelihood, joined out of fear believing the rumour that those Natal Afrikaners who did not take up arms would be treated as rebels of the The meeting to do this was originally planned for Paddafontein, the location of the Judith Dutch Reformed Church, half-way between Dundee and Helpmekaar, but it was moved to the magistrate's office in Dundee. Two distinct groups were present at the meeting held under the chairmanship of DP Wolfaardt (JP): loyalists, and those willing to comply with the notice. This made for a volatile mix which was ignited by the opposing views of the local residents regarding their allegiance to the crown. Wolfaardt made it clear: "...that if any Afrikander is so rotten as not to take up arms, he must be plundered and persecuted by any burgher who come across him." He took the argument one step further and declared that the local Afrikaners' allegiance to Britain was null and void since the British had vacated the area. This was disputed by AL Jansen, who emphasized that such an oath could not be broken. Jansen proceeded to warn all those present against joining the Boers. Another local Afrikaner, Barend Liebenberg, also did not mince his words and made it clear that he was a British subject and intended to remain one. His vociferous manner made him a marked man from then on. 76 Realising that they would possibly be conscripted, a number of those present requested passes to cross the Tugela. The request was refused and only passes to cross into the besieged Ladysmith were offered. Thereafter the loyalists left the meeting.
77
It seems that the focus of the meeting then shifted to its original task, namely the election of officers. Piet van Rensenburg was elected as field-cornet and DC Uys as his assistant. The "Vierkleur" was, amongst cheers raised by a local Afrikaner, Barend van der Linden, and those present were informed that they had to attend a meeting on 2 December 1899, at Dundee to receive arms. Afterwards JC Vermaak was appointed secretary and with the assistance of Uys drew up the commandeering lists. 78 The mood of the majority of Afrikaners at the time of the meeting is best summed up by an impartial observer, GC Bailey, a local minister in the Anglican Church: "A few are quite ready to join in, and a few, and those some of the best standing are most determined in their loyalty. The rest I fear will be frightened into taking up arms, although they would far rather remain quiet. From all I can hear there was a good deal of threatening... If the Boers had not invaded Natal, no Natal Boer would have joined; they are well content with British rule. As some of them say, "What more can we obtain, even if the Transvaal do win, and if they lose, then where are we?"
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The meeting scheduled to supply the commandeered Dundee Afrikaners with weapons took place at Dundee on 2 December. The promised arms were, however, not forthcoming and the meeting was rescheduled for 5 December at Paddafontein. 80 The
Paddafontein meeting was not without incident and it seems that some Dundee Afrikaners again objected to being commandeered. Their leader, DC (Dirk) Pieters, read Commandant-General Piet Joubert's proclamation to all those present explaining its contents which said that nobody could be forced to take-up arms. According to JC Vermaak they were also issued with identification cards so that they could be identified in the event of death while they were informed that three horses would be compensated by the Transvaal Government. 
Bringing the Newcastle District Afrikaners into the fold
A meeting to entice the Afrikaner residents of the Newcastle District to join was held at Dannhauser. 88 Like at Wasbank, some concerns regarding the problems those who had taken the oath of allegiance to the crown and who intended to remain loyal would face, should they adhere to the commandeering order, were raised. It can be assumed that these concerns were treated in a comparable manner to the issues which were posed at Wasbank, 89 because shortly afterwards, a large number of Newcastle Afrikaners were forced into the fold.
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The meeting to commandeer the Afrikaners of the Newcastle District and to elect officers from their ranks took place on Wednesday 29 November 1899, at the Newcastle magistrate's office. 91 The message conveyed was the same as at Wasbank:
they were compelled to join since a black uprising was a possibility and because they were now Transvaal subjects. This point was reiterated by Jan van Rooyen the special Immense pressure was placed on those who refused to join and many were intimidated and coaxed into enlisting for non-combat duties against their will.
94 In the case of the English who did not want to enlist it was said: "Any man who has been out here 30 years is a Dutchman." 95 This must have appealed to GH Shorter who despite being born in England, adhered to the commandeering order. He even had his photograph taken under arms in front of the Newcastle Town Hall.
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Afrikaners unwilling to join the Newcastle Commando were deployed in noncombat duties, 97 but these orders did not last and some were, within a week, conscripted to do guard duty. 98 Just before Christmas those who persisted in dodging service were told in no uncertain terms that they had to take up arms or leave the county. As a result of this threat many opted to perform police duty while others fled to escape commandeering. 99 PJC Adendorff and his wife departed on 14 December 1899 for
Harrismith, while C Bierbaum, W Sander, the Collyer brothers and David Keay, fled into the forests and ravines of the northern Drakensberg.
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Unwillingness to comply with the commandeering orders was treated with little mercy. Burgher Steyn, led by a black youth provided by Missionary Prozesky, went in search of Bierbaum, Sander, Keay and the Collyers. 101 Two brothers, Thomas Commando. 102 PJC Adendorff likewise failed to escape and with his brother's assistance found a position as clerk in the office of the justice of the peace at Charlestown. 103 The attempts by Johannes Theodorus O'Neill to flee to the British lines also failed and he was apprehended and sent on commando to Zululand.
104
The induction of the Newcastle Afrikaners who opted for combat duty in the Transvaal forces was formalised on 5 December when they were issued with Mausers, ammunition, and bandoliers at the magistrate's office. 105 The 127 strong Newcastle
Commando thereafter departed via Dundee 106 across the Buffalo River, Scheepers Nek and Vryheid to the Zululand border. Their duty was to safe guard the border and deal with a possible black uprising.
107
The Klip River District (Ladysmith District) Afrikaners conscripted by the Boers Several white male residents from the Ladysmith area had attended the initial meeting held at Wasbank. 108 A short while later all white men from the area received a note from TR Dannhauser who, on behalf of Lodewyk de Jager and Schalk Burger, commandeered them to attend a meeting on 29 November 1899 on Joseph Muller's farm Doornkraal, Elandslaagte. The aims of the meeting was to gain clarity on what it meant to be living under the protection of the Transvaal, to form a police force to deal with the increase in stock theft and to address the spread of smallpox.
attended the meeting. On arrival the men were presented with a document, addressed to the ZAR authorities, which they were expected to sign requesting the creation of a police corps to address the stock theft issue. Under Secretary of State Krogh of the ZAR then addressed the meeting and also facilitated the election of a field-cornet for the area. Three candidates were nominated: Lukas W Meyer, Otto (OW) Krogman and Hermanus Potgieter. In the subsequent election Krogman received 27 votes, Meyer 24 and Potgieter 8. Krogman and Krogh then ordered those present to be at Elandslaagte within 24 hours with whatever arms they had. Half would be deployed on the front and the other half kept in reserve.
FJT Brandon and many others present felt that they had been deceived and betrayed, as they had not attended the meeting expecting to be commandeered but to do police work.
110 WC Hattingh (JP), who at the Wasbank meeting had spoken out strongly against commandeering, likewise felt tricked. He attended the Doornkraal meeting and took part in the voting under the impression that it had to do with police duties, only to realise afterwards that they were being enlisted. 111 Attendees who, in accordance with Joubert's proclamation, requested a pass to leave the area likewise felt that they were misled because they were informed that this request could not be granted since they had voted for a field-cornet. 112 All those present thus, willingly or unwillingly, became members of the Boer forces or administration.
The Boer authorities had a far easier task in enlisting the Ladysmith Afrikaners residing in the lower reaches of the Klip River District. Here many voluntarily joined the Boer forces, possibly because of the overwhelming presence of the Boer Army. Uziko's Kraal, and in military operations around Ladysmith. 115 Most importantly, they readily supplied their knowledge of the terrain to the invaders and in the case of the elderly HA Potgieter of Beauvale, assisted the Boers by pointing out the drifts in the Tugela River.
116
The plight of the Natal Afrikaner rebels
What then did the Republics gain from forcing large numbers of Natal Afrikaners, ranging from boys in their teens to old-men in their seventies, who were British subjects, against their will into their forces? The 127 strong Newcastle Commando, who were tasked to safe guard the Zululand border and deal with a possible black uprising, saw little or no action. 117 It seems as if this task was done with very little conviction as the personnel fluctuated greatly with some members returning to the Newcastle District in mid-January 1900. 118 In an attempt to reverse the slipping away of the Newcastle Afrikaners from commando strict commandeering instructions were issued. 119 This seems to have had some success and the likes of DL van Niekerk and others, 120 who had previously managed to escape commandeering, were brought into the fold. 121 Field-Cornet Chris Botha, furthermore, overplayed the possibility of a black uprising to such an extent that almost all the men who had remained around Newcastle to perform non-combat duties were despatched to the Vryheid District.
122
The aggressive leadership style of Botha ensured that the Newcastle Commando became part of the 700 strong force 123 that attacked and overran the magistracy at Nqutu on 31 January 1900. 124 The attack did not take place without internal conflict. Most of the Natal men were not keen on taking part in an attack on an establishment of their own government and sent memorials to the effect to their leaders. No notice was taken of the protests. According to a black witness, Jonas, CL de Wet and his brother-in-law then aggressively confronted the rebel leaders and threw down their weapons in front of them claiming that the Boers had deceived them and that they "never really wanted to fight natives." De Wet then challenged the leaders to arrest and send him to Pretoria. In the process the Newcastle Afrikaners, who opted for non-combat positions to avoid taking up arms, possibly rendered greater support to the Republican cause than those performing combat duty.
The so-called "Natal Commando" made up of Afrikaners of the Dundee area, and stationed at Helpmekaar, possibly never exceeded 150. It appears that the Natal Commando had no burning desire to distinguish themselves. Instead, they were very content to stay in the laager without rendering any active service to the Republics. 137 The Helpmekaar Laager accordingly functioned in a very laissez faire manner with some of the commandeered Dundee Afrikaners only staying for brief periods at a time. GJ Jordaan for instance, remained for but two weeks and 138 HH Laatz (jnr) for three weeks. 139 So relaxed was the atmosphere that it was exploited by Newcastle Afrikaners like JB Low 140 and JP van der Westhuyzen 141 who reported for duty at Helpmekaar rather than to proceed to Zululand. 142 The Special Court, which was created to try rebels, would eventually describe the role of the Natal Commando as "conducting patrols and general military work" on the Biggarsberg, around Helpmekaar and on the road down to the lower Tugela River. 143 In exceptional cases patrolling occurred further afield. 144 It soon became clear that the ZAR did not want to commit the Natal Commando to the front line simply because most of its members could not be trusted.
145
On their part the Dundee Afrikaners stationed at Helpmekaar were clearly not content, especially with the policy of the ZAR authorities towards the loyalists who managed to evade conscription. In early January 1900, a letter to General JJ Ferreira, signed by 96 Afrikaners, argued that they were informed at the commandeering meeting held at Dundee on 29 November 1899, "that you either supported the Boers or you were against them". Those who opted for the second choice were to be expelled across the Tugela within seven days. This did not happen and a third option seems to have opened up, that of remaining neutral. If this was a viable option some of the signatories indicated that they also would like to remain neutral since it was safer and more comfortable. The signatories further argued that if they fell into the hands of the British they could be executed for taking up arms. They therefore called on the Transvaal authorities, for the sake of the rebels, to implement the earlier choice for local whites to either enrol or be expelled across the Tugela. 146 Similar concerns raised with
Commandant-General PJ Joubert on his visit to Helpmekaar on 13 February 1900 fell on deaf ears. 147 In the light of the above it is understandable why the Dundee Afrikaners seemed more inclined to harass the loyalists in the area than to serve the Boers. On several occasion they formed a body of men to carry out arrests and requisition property belonging to loyal British subjects. 148 Intimidation tactics like these had some success and a number of men who did not join at Paddafontein subsequently did so out of fear. 149 The relief of Ladysmith signalled the end of the responsibility the conscripted Afrikaners from Dundee felt towards the Republics. As a result the Natal Commando was practically disbanded and many rebels were granted leave to attend to their farms and livestock, while others started to retreat with their effects into the Transvaal. 150 Only a small number opted to remain with the Boer commandos. 151 Despite being tricked, most of the Ladysmith Afrikaners who had attended the meeting at Doornkraal gathered at the appointed time at the commissariat at Elandslaagte. Here they were eventually each issued with a Mauser, bandoliers and ammunition. 152 The following day what became known as "Otto's Commando" rode to the Boer "hoofdlaager" at Modderspruit. Those who refused to be commandeered were allocated civil or non-combat positions such as police work and smallpox guards. The Ladysmith Afrikaners were after further delays instructed by General Joubert, since they knew the area, to accompany some burghers on a patrol down the Tugela River to Umhlumayo with the purpose of determining if a drift existed where the British could cross. The 60-strong commando, under Otto Krogman, returned a couple of days later after having lost their way. 153 Hereafter men like FM Colling, AI Marais, 154 IJ Buys, JF, FA, CJ and JT Truscott 155 worked as policemen and smallpox guards. Apart from dealing with smallpox, they also had to search the homesteads of blacks for firearms and deal with stock theft. 156 Some were allocated an additional role, namely that of military policemen, with the task of arresting deserting burghers. 157 Eventually when Boer resistance started to crumble before the advance of the armies of Roberts and Buller the ZAR deserted the Klip River Afrikaners whom they had compelled into service. A lone Transvaal voice raised the future prospects which the Klip River County Afrikaners faced. In a letter to President Kruger, E Neethling, pleaded with him to put an end to the abandoning by their Republican kin of specifically the Newcastle Afrikaners. Neethling felt ashamed that the Natal Afrikaners were standing to lose everything due to their having sided with the Boers.
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And lose everything they did. After the reoccupation of the Klip River County by the British Army and the Natal Colonial authorities those Natal Afrikaners who had collaborated with the invaders were prosecuted, tried and convicted. It is likely that most Natal Afrikaners who resided in the area occupied by the Boers had in one way or another compromised their loyalty to the crown by, as the Natal Witness described it, joining "hands in a struggle false in its foundation, cruel and wicked in its action and suicidal in its certain result."
159 However, only a little over 500 of the Afrikaners of the Klip River County suspected of having taken part in the rebellion were arrested. 160 Eventually 302 of these were convicted of high treason. As far as sentences were concerned, the rebels were fined and/or imprisoned. The heaviest punishment imposed was that on CS Botha of Drycut, Newcastle who was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and a fine of 500 or a further year imprisonment. 161 The lightest sentence, that of one day, was given to 17-year-old ME Smit, 15-year-old HJ Strydom, 17-year-old GM Dekker and LW Eksteen. 162 But even worse was the economic suffering the rebels had to endure. Tens of thousands head of livestock, as well as other movable property, were lost to the military and Colonial authorities while immovable property were destroyed in numerous instances.
Conclusion
When the Anglo-Boer War broke out, the Natal Afrikaners of Klip River County were deserted by the Colonial and Imperial authorities who adopted no measures or policies to protect them against the invading Republicans. On the other hand the Boers, as the invading and eventually occupying military force, expected the Natal Afrikaners who were related to them by culture, language, ethnic origin and kin, to join them in their struggle. When the vast majority did not come forward to do this, they found themselves in a political vice grip which, for the duration of the 242-day the 158 Boer occupation of Klip River County, kept on pressurising them into joining the Republican cause. In spite of this pressure the vast majority of Afrikaners from Klip River County opted not to choose the traumatic path of rebellion, but were coerced into it. Within this context the phrase coined by the historian, Verne Harris, "reluctant rebels", rings perfectly true. 163 When the British forces finally liberated the Klip River County in May 1900, the Natal Afrikaners were deserted by the Boers. Subsequent claims by the Natal Afrikaner residents of the area that rebellion was forced upon them by means of conscription into a crude commandeering system, pursued in an inconsistent manner and based on deception, was rejected by their liberators. 164 Similarly, claims that they were abandoned by the Imperial and Colonial authorities were not accepted. As a result the Natal Colonial authorities held the rebels responsible for their actions and proceeded to punish them. Subsequently the Klip River County Afrikaners, who were caught between the Boers and the British, felt that they had three enemies -the Boers, the British Army and the Natal Colonial authorities. 
